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Evidence on the relationship between political contributions and legislators' voting behavior is marred
by concerns about endogeneity in the estimation process.  Using a legislator's offspring sex mix as
an exogenous variable, we employ a two-stage least squares estimation procedure to predict the effect
of voting behavior on political contributions.  Following previous research, we find that a legislator's
proportion daughters has a significant effect on voting behavior for women's issues, as measured by
score in the "Congressional Record on Choice" issued by NARAL Pro-Choice America.  In the second
stage, we make a unique contribution by demonstrating a significant impact of exogenous voting behavior
on PAC contributions, lending credibility to the hypothesis that Political Action Committees respond
to legislators' voting patterns by "rewarding" political candidates that vote in line with the positions
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INTRODUCTION: 
The relationship between Congressional voting behavior and political 
contributions remains a continuing puzzle for social scientists interested in the American 
political process.  We know that there is a high correlation between how legislators vote 
and how they are rated by interested Political Action Committees (PACs) on the one 
hand, and the amount of donations that legislators receive from these lobbyist groups, on 
the other.  Using the data from NARAL Pro-Choice America in this paper, for instance, 
Table 1 illustrates the high correlation between PAC contributions from NARAL in a 
given election cycle and voting scores assigned by the organization for the previous 
Congressional session.  
 
        << Insert Table 1 here >>  
 
However, though of critical importance to understanding the role of money in the 
lawmaking process, sorting out causal directionality here is extremely difficult 
methodologically.  To what extent do contributions from political action committees 
(PACs) actually influence the voting patterns of elected officials – a particularly 
worrisome dynamic from the point of view of those concerned with influence peddling?  
Or, conversely, to what extent do the voting record and ideological commitments of an 
elected official influence his or her PAC contributions – a “rewards” based system of 
political patronage that may still be troubling to those concerned with the influence of 
money on democracy but which is less blatantly a bribery system?  Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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While most research attempting to disentangle these possibilities has focused on 
estimating the former dynamic, this paper examines the latter – namely, the extent to 
which PAC contributions are used as “rewards” for legislators that support PACs 
position.  We focus on PAC donations since such campaign contributions are explicitly 
linked to a legislative agenda; in the conclusion, we discuss the generalizability of this 
sector to political donations more generally (i.e. from private individuals, corporations, 
unions and other donor groups).  Concerns about generalizability of PAC money aside, 
PAC donations are interesting to explore in their own right as they represent a significant 
share of the total amount of campaign donations received by members of the U.S. 
Congress.   As shown in Figure 1, approximately 40% of monies received by candidates 
in recent election cycles for the U.S. House of Representatives comes from Political 
Action Committees.   
 
<< Insert Figure 1 >> 
 
In absolute terms, the amount of money donated by PACs to successful House candidates 
has nearly doubled in the last ten years.  As Table 2 and Figure 2 illustrate, successful 
House candidates collected approximately $300,000 from Political Action Committees in 
1998.  By 2006, the average amount collected by successful House candidates reached 
nearly $550,000.  Similarly, the largest PAC receipts for a single successful House 
candidate doubled from  $1.2 million to $2.4 million during this period.   
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      << Insert Figure 2 >>  
 
  While PAC contributions comprise an increasing share of funding in American 
elections, the proliferation of Political Action Committees has been equally spectacular.  
According the Federal Election Commission, the number of registered PACs increased 
five-fold between 1975 and 2000.  This growth has been particularly spectacular amongst 
corporate PACs, which comprise nearly two-fifths of PACs registered with the Federal 
Election Commission in 1999.  Table 3 details the annual growth of Political Action 
Committees, and Figure 3 charts their astronomical rise by reported sector. 
 
<< Insert Figure 3 >> 
      << Insert Table 3 >> 
 
  The growth of Political Action Committees occurred contemporaneously with 
increased concerns amongst the electorate about the role of money in our political 
system.  Anecdotal evidence suggests--and recent public opinion polls confirm--that the 
pervasiveness of money in the nation’s political process is viewed as a serious concern.  
For instance, a 2000 Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll found that over 80% of 
respondents believed Political Action Committees wielded too much power and influence 
in Washington.  Similarly, over half of adults surveyed in a 2000 Newsweek poll claimed 
that the influence of political contributions on government policy was a major problem in 
Washington.  
 Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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      << Insert Table 4 >>  
      << Insert Table 5 >>  
 
These polls underscore concern amongst the electorate about the influence of money in 
the policymaking process.  Taken together, the growth of Political Action Committees, 
their prevalence in financing political campaigns, and mounting concern about the 
influence of money and politics justify the scope of this study.   
 
BACKGROUND: 
Despite the enormity of the scale of political donations and the seriousness of the 
issue, both from a theoretical perspective as well as from the point of view of public 
concern about the potential ‘tainting’ of the political process, determining the direction of 
causality between political contributions and voting behavior remains elusive.  The 
majority of research on this subject examines the hypothesis that financial contributions 
from political action committees influence the voting decisions of members of Congress 
(see Grenzke 1989a; Grenzke 1989b).   
One theory, for example, suggests that over and above other important factors 
such as party affiliation (Stratmann 1996; Rudolph 1999), seniority (Grenzke 1989a), 
committee assignments (Grier and Munger 1993; Grier and Munger 1991; Evans 1988) 
and other legislator characteristics, ideological ‘fence-sitters’ should elicit the greatest 
financial support in a ‘bidding war’ of sorts for their swing votes on important issues.  In 
terms of individual legislator characteristics, this theory predicts that moderates, rather 
than committed liberals or conservatives, are most susceptible to influence peddling from Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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PACs.  Fleischer (1993) concludes that his results on the impact of defense PACs on 
defense spending “indicate that contributions from defense PACs can under certain 
circumstances marginally influence the votes of members, especially those members with 
weaker ideological predispositions.” (Fleischer 1993: 406) Those without clear, 
consistent policy positions are viewed as most swayable, and political contributions are 
aimed at influencing these legislators’ voting behavior.   
Yet, other recent empirical evidence suggests the opposite – that a consistent 
ideological position is associated with high campaign contributions.   In a recent NBER 
working paper, Kroszner and Stratmann (2000) find that a clear, well-known ideological 
position increases campaign contributions.  Using the percent of repeat givers as a proxy 
for a legislator’s reputational development, Kroszner and Stratmann (2000) report that 
“high reputational development is rewarded with high total contributions.” (Kroszner and 
Stratmann 2000: 25)  In their analysis, contributions from PACs increase as legislators 
build their reputational clarity, suggesting that this consistent ideological positioning 
benefits legislators.   Such a result suggests that rather than ‘buying’ votes directly, 
political contributors may tend to invest in legislators who will provide ‘sure’ returns 
based on prior patterns.
1 
Net of individual legislator characteristics, the literature suggests that PACs 
should be most influential in low profile, non-ideological issues.  Again, Fleisher (1993) 
tests the effect of political contributions from organizations involved in the national 
                                                 
1 These conclusions build on earlier attempts to understand the effect of ideological positioning on 
campaign contributions. Some research leaves out the ideology variable because of its multicolinearity with 
political party affiliation (Grenzke 1988).  Other research includes an aggregate measure of ideology, such 
as the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score for each legislator, and finds significant effects of 
ideology on PAC contributions (Evans 1988; Borck 1996).   
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defense industry.  Using a two-stage least squares estimation procedure to overcome the 
simultaneity of defense PAC donations and voting behavior, Fleisher predicts PAC 
contributions using characteristics of individual legislators and their districts in his 
model, including a legislator’s campaign receipts from other PACs.  In the second stage, 
this instrumented variable for defense PAC contributions is used to predict support for 
defense legislation in the 100
th Congress. While Fleisher concludes, along with existing 
literature, that ideology plays a powerful role in explaining voting behavior, he also finds 
a significant effect of defense PAC contributions, although the magnitude of this effect is 
small. Unfortunately, the variables Fleisher claims to be exogenous in the first stage (e.g., 
ideology, contracts received from the Defense Department, party, etc.) in predicting 
defense PAC contributions do not meet the exclusion restriction; in other words, we 
should expect all those factors to affect voting on defense issues independent of 
donations. 
  Likewise, Grenzke (1989b) finds that political contributions are unlikely to 
change voting behavior, even for low profile, niche issues. In the first stage, Grenzke 
predicts PAC contributions from a host of variables, including electoral vulnerability and 
member’s power (Grenzke 1989b: 8). Grenzke lags the effect of political contributions by 
using contributions in both the simultaneous year and the preceding year to when the 
behavior was measured.  In other words, for voting during the 95
th Congress (1977-
1978), Grenzke uses both contributions during the 1977-1978 election cycle, as well as 
during the 1975-1976 election cycle.  Of twenty-nine models, Grenzke finds only four 
significant associations in the simultaneous relationship and one significant association in 
the lagged relationship.  As a result, Grenzke concludes that “contributions from 120 Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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PACs affiliated with 10 large interest groups generally do not maintain or change House 
members’ voting patterns.” (Grenzke 1989b: 19)  As with Fleisher’s study, Grenzke’s 
instrument (electoral vulnerability) fails the second-stage exclusion restriction, as we 
would expect that variables like electoral vulnerability to affect both PAC contributions 
(if more vulnerable incumbents are on the prowl for money) and voting behavior (if 
electoral vulnerability makes incumbents more likely to vote in ways appealing to 
particular constituencies that may, for example, stimulate job growth in their districts). 
In addition to examining high-visibility and low-visibility issues separately, Grier 
and Munger (1993) argue that institutional context matters.  In the House, where much of 
the legislative work is performed in committee, committee assignments are significant 
predictors of campaign contributions; in the Senate, on the other hand, party affiliation 
plays a more significant role in determining contributions.  Witko (2006) builds on this 
analysis by arguing that the “issue context” matters.   Using probit analysis to measure 
the effect of PAC contributions on ideological, visible issues versus non-ideological, non-
visible issues, he argues that contributions influence voting behavior on non-visible 
issues, but influence measures of participation on more visible ones.  These measures of 
participation include the number of times a legislator participates in a committee hearing, 
the number of amendments submitted by legislators, and the number of lines of text 
added by legislators to hearing transcripts.  Thus, Witko challenges the traditional 
explanation that PAC contributions matter for non-ideological, non-visible issues.  He 
argues instead that, for visible, ideological issues, PAC contributions matter earlier in the 
legislative process, when legislators are participating in committee hearings and offering 
legislative amendments. (Witko 2006: 289) This analysis leads to a more nuanced Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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understanding of the impact of campaign contributions on political behavior by 
suggesting that researchers must examine committee participation, as well as actual 
voting behavior.  
While Witko (2006) offers an alternative to the money-votes linkage by 
suggesting that political contributions are linked with other forms of legislator 
participation, recent experimental evidence on the relationship between contributions and 
access suggests otherwise.  Chin (2005) conducted an experiment in which Congressional 
schedulers were given a set of hypothetical schedule requests, along with a weekly 
schedule for a member of Congress.  These staff members are asked to schedule the 
member of Congress, based on the set of letters and requests available to the scheduler. 
Using a variety of experimental conditions, Chin (2005) concludes that it is constituency 
status, rather than campaign contribution history, that significantly affects the likelihood 
of a scheduling request being accepted.  While this experimental study may be of limited 
external validity due to the hypothetical nature of the research, it does suggest that 
political contributions may not be paramount in gaining access to legislators. 
In another effort to get at the heart of the relationship between voting behavior 
and political contributions, Bronars and Lott (1997) examine the voting behavior of 
retiring members of Congress in their final term in Congress.  If the need for campaign 
donations to secure reelection impacts legislative behavior, then the decision to retire – 
and subsequently stop receiving political contributions – should change the voting 
behavior of members by freeing them from such considerations to instead purely vote 
their conscience.  They find no evidence for this hypothesis, thereby calling into dispute 
the notion that political contributions affect voting behavior.  However, it could be the Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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case that PACs have already ‘trapped’ retiring legislators into a path-dependent voting 
record that conditions votes during that member’s final Congressional term; or that the 
retiring member is responsive to the same lobbying forces but this time with the carrot of 
a lucrative position in the private sector post-retirement; or that the member is voting to 
maximize donations to his/her anointed successor in an implicit bargain.   
  The evidence presented thus far—both from experimental research examining the 
relationship between money and access, as well as the quantitative research linking 
political donations to voting behavior—may allay the fears of those concerned with the 
‘buying’ of votes through campaign donations by political action committees.  If the 
causal relationship between donations and voting is weak, we should expect that the 
‘residual’ impact of voting on donations is strong to account for the high overall 
correlation.  With this expectation in mind, the present study tries to quantify the extent 
to which voting patterns of a legislator during a given Congress affects the donations of a 
particular PAC to that member in the subsequent election cycle.  Of course, merely 
deploying temporal ordering does not satisfy the condition of strict (or even weak) 
exogeneity in a time series analysis.  For example, it could be that members of Congress 
vote a certain way in anticipation of (i.e. fishing for) donations from a PAC (or perhaps 
as a result of explicit or implicit promises). Clearly, such a dynamic would be troubling 
from the point of view of the democratic process just as much as simultaneous exchange 
of money for votes or prior donations driving future votes. 
  To preempt this issue, we employ a unique estimation strategy: We use 
exogenous variation in the sex mix of legislators’ children to predict their voting patterns 
on certain issues.  Sex mix has been used as an instrument for parental labor force Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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participation (Angrist and Evans 1998), for parental divorce ( Dahl and Moretti 2004), 
and for parental investment in offspring (Conley and Glauber 2006).  The appeal of this 
instrument lies in its random assignment in a country—like the U.S.—where there is little 
to no antenatal sex selection (i.e. sex selective abortion). 
This utilization of the random variation provided by the sex-mix of offspring to 
predict voting patterns becomes the first stage in an IV-regression of lagged voting on 
political contributions, thereby providing us with a ‘clean’ estimate of the impact of 
voting on donation.   Specifically, we follow Washington (2007) who shows that 
Congressmen who have more daughters—conditional on number of total children—tend 
to vote in a way that receives higher ratings from women’s issues PACs, such as the 
National Organization for/of Women (NOW), and lower ratings from pro-life PACs, like 
Right to Life.  Her results hold for legislators from both parties—though, of course, 
Democrats receive higher average scores.  She interprets this result as a ‘socialization 
effect’—that is, daughters, she argues, influence the thinking of their parents.  However, 
it is equally possible, we believe, that her finding results from a shift in the legislator’s 
own interests.  If a legislator does not have a daughter, then s/he may care less about 
policies to better the lives and opportunities of women than someone who has a daughter, 
ceritus parabus.  Put more starkly, if a legislator does not have a teenage daughter who 
may become pregnant, s/he may not be as personally impacted by, for example, abortion 
restrictions.
2   
  The good news is that, for our analysis, the reason(s) for the effect are not 
important as long as they meet the exclusion restriction for our second stage.  Namely, 
                                                 
2 In Washington’s data, the association between proportion daughters and NOW score is positive for both 
male and female legislators.  However, only for male legislators is the association statistically significant, 
and the magnitude of the association is greater for men than for women.  (See Washington 2007, Table 3)     Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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there can be no indirect effect (i.e. not reflected in their voting record and rating of that 
record by the PAC) of the sex mix of legislators’ offspring on the donations they receive 
from a given PAC.  This boils down to the assumption that PACs do not intentionally or 
unintentionally give more donations to legislators with daughters, net of their evaluations 
of those legislators.  This seems like a reasonable assumption.  If there were subtle bias in 
PAC behavior thanks to the composition of the legislator’s family, we would likely see it 
in the overall rating of that legislator, too, and not just in the donation amounts.  This 
assumption falls apart to the extent that ratings are made very unalterable algorithms and 
donations are made by more flexible, ‘softer’ criteria.  Even if this difference in PAC 
decision making processes exists at these two decision points, it is still unlikely to reflect 
bias induced by the sex mix of children to any significant degree 
Another way that the exclusion restriction might be violated would be if the 
presence of daughters makes the legislators more or less powerful in Congress in ways 
that are independent of their actual votes.  For example, conditional on how many 
children a member of Congress has, the proportion of daughters may influence how well 
liked s/he is in her/his home district; or partisanship
3; or it may affect committee 
assignment; or leadership roles; or tenure—all factors that have been shown to be 
associated with donation levels.  While it may be easy to come up with reasons why the 
number of children a legislator has could affect their Congressional careers in any 
number of ways, it is much more difficult to suggest that the proportion of daughters 
                                                 
3 In running descriptive statistics for legislators of both parties, we find that the proportion daughters differs 
by political party, and the difference – in which Republicans have a lower proportion daughters – is 
significant at the .05 level. The mean proportion daughters for Republicans is 0.49 and for Democrats is 
0.53.  A t-test for the difference in means suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level.   
This may suggest that proportion daughters influences party affiliation (though it also may be a chance 
finding given the number of observables we tested and the small, substantive magnitude of the difference); 
nonetheless, we control for party ID in our analysis.  Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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does.  One possible problem is that having two same sex children among the first two 
born has been shown to influence whether or not parents go on to have additional 
children (Angrist and Evans 1998; Conley and Glauber 2006).  However, our key 
indicator is not “same sex” but rather proportion girls; furthermore, the fact that the 
impact of each additional daughter appears linear and works for legislators with two 
children or with three, the idea that the presence of two daughters is driving PAC score 
through fertility should be allayed. 
 
DATA AND METHODS: 
  We estimate the effect of voting behavior on contributions from Political Action 
Committees using a two-stage least squares approach.  As previous research finds that the 
proportion daughters for federal legislators is a significant predictor of voting behavior 
for women’s issues (Washington 2007), we limit our analysis to issues identified by 
NARAL Pro-Choice America in the annual “Congressional Record on Choice.”  NARAL 
Pro-Choice America is one of the largest organizations advocating for a woman’s right to 
choose.  The organization lobbies on women’s issues, including birth control, abortion, 
and sex education, and has contributed more than two million dollars to political 
candidates in each of the three previous election cycles.  The organization also rates 
legislators, based on their voting patterns for an aggregate set of bills tracked by the 
organization.   
  For the present project, we compiled an extensive dataset for members of the 
United States House of Representatives from the 105
th Congress (1997-1998) through the 
108
th Congress (2003-2004).  Using a dataset originally compiled by Washington (2007) Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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that included proportion daughters, age, and religion of each member of the House of 
Representatives, we expanded the dataset to include PAC contributions from NARAL 
Pro-Choice America for each election cycle from 1998 to 2006, as well as scores from 
NARAL Pro-Choice America from 1997 through 2004.   
In our sample of legislators, the mean representative is 55 years old and has 2.45 
children.  Of the 1,740 person-year observations in our dataset, four observations are 
missing data on the number of children.
4  Another 225 observations are legislators 
without children, and these legislators are therefore excluded from our analysis.  As a 
result, we limit our analysis to the 1,511 observations in which legislators have children, 
and we have accurate data about the sex mix of those children.  Of this sample of 
legislators with children, the mean proportion of daughters is 0.51. 
In the first stage of each analysis (outlined below), we use scores assigned by 
NARAL as the dependent variable.  NARAL scores legislators on a scale of 0 – 100 
based on a composite of votes each year, and these scores are published in NARAL’s 
annual “Congressional Record on Choice.”  A legislator receiving a score of 100 voted in 
concurrence with the NARAL position on each of the Congressional votes for that year; a 
legislator receiving a score of 0 voted the opposite of the position supported by NARAL 
on each piece of legislation.  The number of votes used in the annual composite varies by 
year, with as few as two votes in 2004 to nineteen votes in 1997.  In a typical year, the 
Congressional Record on Choice includes votes on issues like the “Partial Birth” 
Abortion Ban; an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization Act forbidding 
military personnel from obtaining privately-funded abortions at overseas military 
                                                 
4 Data on the sex mix of children is missing for Representatives Michael Pappas (R-NJ), Timothy Johnson 
(R-IL), and Michael Burgess (R-TX).   Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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hospitals; an amendment to the Agricultural Appropriations banning the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) from testing drugs for early, non-surgical abortions; the denial of 
U.S. family planning assistance abroad to non-governmental organizations that use 
private funds to provide abortions; and an amendment to the Labor, Health and Human 
Services Appropriations banning the prescription of emergency contraception pills at 
school-based health centers.
5  We transformed annual scores for legislators into a score 
for each legislator in each Congress by averaging a legislator’s score across the two-year 
period for that Congress.  For example, if a legislator received a score of 80 for the year 
1997 and 90 for the year 1998, we averaged that legislator’s score to give him/her a 
NARAL score of 85 for the 105
th Congress.  In Table 6, we provide the frequency of 
scores for legislators in each Congress.  As the table suggests, the majority of legislators 
scored either a 0 or 100 in each Congress, although there is significant variation across 
the range of scores. 
   
<< Insert Table 6 here >>  
 
The mean NARAL score varied significantly by political party, with the average 
Democrat receiving a NARAL score of 76, while the average Republican received a 
NARAL score of 11.   
Information on political contributions from NARAL Pro-Choice America was 
compiled from the website www.opensecrets.org, and includes observations for each 
person-year.  In the four election cycles considered in this paper (and, thus, 1,740 person-
years), 1,457 observations – or approximately 84% – received no money from NARAL 
                                                 
5 The examples listed here are each from the 2000 Congressional Record on Choice. Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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Pro-Choice America.  Table 7 illustrates the frequency distribution, by $1,000 
contributions.   
 
      << Insert Table 7 here >>  
 
The maximum donation recorded was $10,000, and it appears in thirteen cases in our 
data.  The mean contribution per person-year is $396.87, although this varies by political 
party, as well.  The average Democrat received $765.48 from NARAL, whereas the mean 
Republican received $59.10.  In fact, only seven Republican received donations from 
NARAL Pro-Choice America during the time period covered, accounting for 13 unique 
observations in our dataset.
6   Of the observations for Democrats in our dataset, there are 
270 cases – or 32.45% of observations for Democrats – in which members received 
contributions from NARAL.       
We begin by using a “naïve” ordinary least squares analysis to predict whether a 
legislator was the recipient of donations from NARAL Pro-Choice America.  In this 
model (and all subsequent ones), we have accounted for the fact that a legislator’s score 
is likely to affect political contributions in the subsequent election cycle by lagging our 
measure of PAC contributions.  We match donations in an election cycle with the score 
received by a legislator during the preceding Congress.  For example, we predict PAC 
donations in the 1998 election cycle using a legislator’s NARAL Pro-Choice America 
score for the years 1997-1998 (105
th Congress).   The temporal ordering of this 
                                                 
6 The following is a list of Republic members receiving NARAL contributions, and the number of election 
cycles during which they received contributions: Constance Morello (R-MD) – 3;  Benjamin Gilman (R-
NY) - 1; Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY) – 2; Nancy Johnson (R-CT) – 3; Frank Pallone (R-NJ) - 1; Rob 
Simmons (R-CT) – 2; Steve Israel (R-NY) – 1.  
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estimation technique logically suggests that voting behavior in the 105
th Congress has an 
effect on the political contributions received in the campaign for the subsequent (106
th) 
Congress.  However, the naïve regression assumes that a legislator’s score is independent 
of the likelihood of receiving a contribution from NARAL Pro-Choice America, and is 
therefore treated as an exogenous independent variable in the regression analysis.  
Although the theoretical literature gives us ample reason to dismiss this assumption, the 
naïve model enables comparison with the instrumented model.  In this linear probability 
model, we control for individual legislator characteristics, including party affiliation, age 




β β β β α
+ + +
+ + + + =
NARALSCORE PROTESTANT
CATHOLIC CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AGE Y
6 5
4 3 2 1   
where Y is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a legislator received money 
from NARAL; AGE is the legislator’s age; DEMOCRAT is a dummy variable for party 
affiliation; CHRISTIAN, CATHOLIC, and PROTESTANT are three dummy variables 
for religion (with a fourth dummy variable, OTHERRELIGION, excluded as the 
reference category); and NARALSCORE is the legislator’s NARAL score as observed. 
  We then compare this approach to results from a 2SLS approach.  The first stage 
predicts NARAL score using the same set of controls, along with a variable, 
PROPDAUGHT (proportion daughters of total children) 
(2)    
ε β β
β β β β α
+ + +
+ + + + =
PROPDAUGHT PROTESTANT
CATHOLIC CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AGE NARALSCORE
6 5
4 3 2 1  
                                                 
7 A logistic regression model yields similar estimates.  We prefer the LPM since Heckman and Macurdy 
(1985) and others have persuasively argued that in an IV- or 2SLS-regression with a dichotomous Y, a 
linear probability estimation is most consistent.   Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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Our second stage regression (LPM) estimates the impact of this instrumented 
NARALSCORE* on the likelihood of receiving a donation from NARAL for each 
legislator in the subsequent election cycle.  This second stage is shown in Equation 3, 
below: 
(3)    
ε β β
β β β β α
+ + +
+ + + + =
* 6 5
4 3 2 1
NARALSCORE PROTESTANT
CATHOLIC CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT AGE Y
 
After presenting the main results, we then refer the reader to an appendix, which contains 
additional analysis, including an IV-regressions broken down by various demographic 
and political variables in our sample, including sex, region, political party and age in an 
effort to determine whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects.    
 
RESULTS: 
As a baseline for comparison, first we estimate an Ordinary Least Squares model 
of the likelihood of NARAL donation in a given election cycle based on NARAL score 
for the previous Congress—using only time ordering as a claim on exogeneity.  We 
present the results of our naïve regression in column A of Table 8, below.  While we 
dismiss these results out of hand because of concerns about endogeneity previous 
discussed, the presentation of the naïve results allow researchers to compare the two stage 
least squares estimation with the ordinary least squares regression to see how the latter 
may misrepresent the magnitude of the effect of a legislator’s NARAL score on the 
probability of receiving a PAC donation.   
 
      << Insert Table 8 here >>  
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Column B of Table 8 shows the first stage of our instrumental variable approach.  
In the first stage of our estimation, we find that proportion daughters has a significant and 
positive effect on a legislator’s NARAL Pro-Choice America score, net of a legislator’s 
age, religion, and political affiliation.  As Column B of Table 8 reports, the positive 
association between proportion of daughters and legislator’s NARAL score is significant 
at the .001 level, and has an association of nearly 10 points.  These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the proportion of daughters has an effect on voting behavior, net 
of other individual characteristics.  More precisely, an increase in the proportion of 
daughters makes a legislator more likely to support legislation important to NARAL Pro-
Choice America such that going from no daughters and all sons to all daughters and no 
sons would raise a legislator’s NARAL score by 10 points.   
In column C of Table 8, above, we show the second stage results in which we use 
a linear probability model and the instrumented value of NARAL score (from the first 
stage shown in Column B) to predict the likelihood that a legislator received 
contributions from NARAL Pro-Choice America. As shown in Column C, we find that 
our instrument for NARAL score is highly significant, and, in fact, the parameter 
estimate is larger than the naïve OLS estimate, though a test shows that they are not 
significantly different from each other.
8   
                                                 
8 To extend our analysis, we also estimated a second stage modeling the effect of a legislator’s 
instrumented score on the amount received, conditional on receiving any contribution from NARAL. 
(Table not shown; available from authors upon request.) We find that, conditional on having received 
money from NARAL, the relationship between NARAL score and PAC contributions is not significant.  
However, we suspect that the small sample size resulting from sub-setting our data is driving the non-
significant results. Given the problematic nature of the small sample size (n=231), we also ran a two-stage 
least squares estimate of the effect of NARAL scores on amount of NARAL contributions for the entire 
population of legislators (i.e. including zero values, n=1511).  When we include the entire population, 
rather than a subset of the population, we find that a legislator’s NARAL score does, in fact, have an effect 
on his/her PAC donations.  A one-point increase in a legislators NARAL score is associated with an 
increase of $20 in PAC contributions from NARAL.  However, this model is of limited additional value to Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS: 
  The relationship between voting behavior and political contributions remains a 
central puzzle in the American political system.  Research attempting to disentangle the 
effects of money in the political process has pointed the causal arrow from contributions 
to behavior, asking whether contributions from political action committees affects the 
voting patterns of legislators.  While this literature is inconclusive, much of the evidence 
suggests that the high correlation between voting behavior and campaign contributions 
does not result from an attempt by PACs to ‘buy’ votes. 
In this paper, we explore an alternative perspective on money and politics.  
Flipping the causal arrow, we ask whether voting behavior determines political 
contributions and, if so, what is the strength of that relationship.  The evidence presented 
in this paper lends credibility to the hypothesis that a legislator’s voting behavior affects 
contributions received from political action committees in subsequent election cycles.  
Using exogenous variation in the sex mix of a legislator’s children, we employ a two 
stage least squares estimation procedure to measure the impact of voting behavior on 
political donations.  We find that the proportion daughters has a significant effect on a 
legislator’s voting behavior with regard to women’s issues, as measured by NARAL Pro-
Choice America scores compiled in their “Congressional Record of Choice.”  In the 
second stage of our analysis, we find a positive association between NARAL score and 
the likelihood of a NARAL PAC contribution, suggesting that voting behavior largely 
determines political contributions.  When we compare this estimate using exogenous 
                                                                                                                                                 
our linear probability estimation of likelihood of receipt of any contribution since the data are so negatively 
skewed, with nearly 85% of observations having not received any NARAL contribution.   
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variration in voting patterns to the “naïve” estimate that merely deploys observed voting 
score in a OLS linear probability model, we find that the two parameter estimates are not 
significantly different, suggesting that the observed relationship is one of rewards and not 
bribery—at least for this PAC on this issue.  A comparison of the results from the two 
models is shown in Figure 4, below 
 
  <<Figure  4  about  Here>> 
  While our evidence moves away from a ‘vote buying’ hypothesis towards a 
system of ‘rewards’, we are careful in extrapolating our results beyond the particular 
policy domain identified in this analysis.  Reproductive rights represent a unique, 
ideologically-charged policy domain, and the ex ante commitment of legislators to 
particular political positions is, we suspect, quite strong.  The ‘rewards’ system identified 
here might be particularly strong for ideologically charged issues where the possibility of 
position shifting from ‘vote buying’ is improbable.  In low-visibility, low-impact issues, 
the possibility of a ‘vote buying’ system may be more plausible, and could be empirically 
tested through a similar estimation procedure.  We encourage researchers to take 
advantage of the methodologies introduced here to test whether the ‘rewards’ system 
holds for less ideological issues—if, of course, suitable instrument for such voting 
patterns can be found.   
On the other hand, it is possible that the unusually high-visibility of reproductive-
related issues might force choice-related PACs to be more conservative in dolling out 
rewards, given the increased scrutiny they endure.  Regardless of the direction of the 
causal arrow, if public perception of high visibility issues suggests that Political Action Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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Committees are using money to ‘buy votes,’ then Political Action Committees might 
respond to this increased public scrutiny by tempering their contributions.  In this 
scenario, PACs advocating for ideological, high-visibility issues may be rewarding 
legislators less than those engaged in low-visibility issues.  Not needing to respond to 
public scrutiny, low-visibility PACs may, in fact, be the most engaged in this system of 
rewards.  
Our analysis is not intended to suggest that Political Action Committees do not 
influence the behavior of legislators.  There are, of course, other ways in which Political 
Action Committees sway individual legislators’ voting behavior.  They may apply 
pressure in committees, or use their prowess to affect the content of legislation. Our 
analysis speaks only to the direct impact of political contributions from Political Action 
Committees to legislators, not to a host of alternative mechanisms through which 
Political Action Committees exercise their political clout.   Instead, it attempts to unravel 
the age-old political question about the relationship between political contributions and 
voting behavior.  The analysis is similarly limited in disentangling the relationship 
between voting behavior and other sources of political contributions, like individual 
donors, labor unions, or corporations.  Political Action Committees are unique insofar as 
they attempt to influence policy on a particular, well-defined subset of political issues 
(e.g., women’s issues).  The relationship between individual contributions, corporate 
contributions or those made by labor unions may be more difficult to disentangle, as the 
measurable outcomes are not as straightforward as those presented in this analysis.  
Nonetheless, future analysis should look towards exploring the important relationship 
between voting behavior and individual donors, corporate contributions and labor unions.  Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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Despite these limitation, the current paper offers some comfort to careful political 
observers that ours may not be, after all, a system of bribery—at least for issues of major 
public concern.  Instead, it’s just desserts. Conley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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APPENDIX 
While the pooled data provides evidence of the exogenous impact of voting 
behavior on political contributions, we further disaggregate the data by examining 
particular sub-samples of our population.  In Table A1, we run similar models by various 
demographic groups, attempting to determine whether the relationship between scores 
and money vary by subgroup.  These results suggest that the relationship between money 
and scores, as outlined above, is particular strong for Democrats and legislators older 
than 55 years old, the mean age in our dataset.  A one-point increase in a legislator’s 
instrumented score is associated with a 1.3% increase in the likelihood of receiving 
contributions for legislators over 55 years old.  Likewise, we find that an increase in 
instrumented NARAL score is associated with approximately a one-percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of receiving donations for both Democratic legislators and non-
Southern legislators.   
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Figure 1: Source of Political Contributions in House Election Cycles, 2004 to 
Present 
 
 Source: Federal Election Commission (FEC) and www.opensecrets.org 
 
Source of Political Contributions in the 2008 House Election, 
as of October 31st, 2007
40%
60%
Contributions from Political Action Committees Other Contributions
Source of Political Contributions in the 2004 House Election, 
January 1st, 2003 to December 31st, 2004
37%
63%
Contributions from Political Action Committees Other Contributions
Variable
Political Affiliation
62.120*** -0.204 64.623*** 0.025 59.398 *** -0.546+ 57.697 *** -0.150 64.997 *** -0.256
(1.627) (0.159) (2.250) (0.179) (2.478) (0.313) (2.404) (0.247) (2.049) (0.231)
35.244** -0.454** 30.736** -0.579 * -7.385 0.029 61.533*** -0.750
(12.388) (0.160) (13.431) (0.242) (18.651) (0.167) (15.508) (0.282)
Religious Affiliation
-27.265 *** -0.036 -19.796 *** 0.001 -73.038 *** -0.132 -22.929 *** -0.244 ** -29.851 *** 0.219 -21.583 ** -0.239 * -20.181 *** 0.004
(3.275) (0.077) (4.211) (0.116) (9.134) (0.118) (4.977) (0.079) (4.594) (0.170) (6.889) (0.112) (3.766) (0.084)
-33.524 *** 0.003 -32.537 *** 0.104 -72.559 *** -0.99 -29.849 *** -0.233** -36.291 *** 0.309 -20.095 ** -0.207 + -34.044 *** 0.069
(3.398) (0.092) (4.426) (0.180) (9.255) (0.116) (5.087) (0.095) (4.839) (0.202) (7.283) (0.108) (3.814) (0.129)
-30.718 *** -0.050 -30.547 *** -0.058 -72.528 *** -0.103 -26.803 *** -0.259 ** -34..293 *** 0.230 -35.516 *** -0.193 -24.770 *** -0.023
(4.210) (0.088) (7.207) (0.181) (9.400) (0.117) (6.141) (0.093) (6.075) (0.195) (8.516) (0.173) (4.811) (0.101)
Additional Variables
0.097 -0.002** -0.200 -0.004 0.315*** 0.001 0.224 -0.001 -0.162 -0.002 -0.018 -0.003* 0.125 -0.002
(0.084) (0.001) (.156) (0.002) (0.083) (0.001) (0.221) (0.002) (0.205) (0.003) (0.134) (0.001) (0.103) (0.001)
0.008 ** 0.011 * 0.003 + 0.004 0.013 * 0.006 0.009
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
9.714*** 9.633* 8.687 *** 11.614*** 9.082* 7.233* 9.879 ***
(2.342) (3.838) (2.595) (3.157) (3.633) (3.421) (2.986)
28.336 0.104 103.280 -0.363 60.482 0.071 16.264 0.274 43.361 -0.241 22.757 0.353 26.024 0.016
(5.905) (0.105) (9.928) (0.579) (10.587) (0.110) (11.413) (0.127) (14.238) (0.346) (9.607) (0.141) (7.228) (0.139)
n 1511 1511 709 709 796 796 693 693 746 746 525 525 986 986
______________
Total
First Stage Second Stage
     Proportion Daughter
     Catholic
     Christian
     Age
     NARAL Score*
               + p < .1 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, standard errors in parentheses
Second Stage
Table A1: Coefficients from the 2SLS Linear Probability Model of Receiving NARAL PAC Contributions on Legislator Characteristics, by demographic and political 
Constant
     Democrat
     Independent
     Protestant
Democrats
Second Stage First Stage
Republicans Under 55 Over 55 South non-South
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second StaConley & McCabe                     Just Desserts? Offspring Sex Mix and Political Donations 
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Figure 3: Growth of Political Action Committees, 1975 to 1999 
 



















Source: Federal Election Commission, PAC Count – 1974 to Present 
http://www.fec.gov/press/pacchart.htm 
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix for NARAL PAC Contributions, NARAL Scores and Legislator Characteristics 





Independent 0.032 -0.056 1.000
Age 0.079 0.073 0.026 1.000
Protestant -0.131 -0.193 -0.027 0.047 1.000
Catholic 0.014 0.145 -0.038 -0.086 -0.721 1.000
Christian -0.105 -0.118 -0.017 0.021 -0.331 -0.186 1.000










Largest PAC Receipts for
Winning House Candidate
1998 $309,130 $1,163,544 
2000 $381,891 $1,316,733 
2002 $413,140 $1,743,146 
2004 $464,982 $1,911,381 
2006 $542,397 $2,437,580 
______






Table 3: Number of Political Action Committees, 1975 to 1999
Year





























                       Source:Federal Election Commission, PAC Count Š 1974 to Present












Somewhat of a 
Problem Not a Problem
Good People being 
discouraged from 
running for office by the 
high costs of campaigns 58% 29% 10%
Political Contributions 
having too much 
influence on elections 
and government policy 57% 31% 10%
____
Table 4: Results from a 2000 Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll on 
Problems for the Political System.
Q: We'd like your opinion about some possible problems that might keep this country's political 
system from working as well as it should. Is this a major problem for this country's political system 
today, somewhat of a problem, or is it not much of a problem?
Source: Newsweek Poll, conducted 1/6-7/00. 753 adults surveyed; compiled by the 
CitizenÕs Research Foundation for the Study of Campaign Finance Reform at the 
University of California at Berkeley












Table 5: 2000 Newsweek Poll on Influence in Washington
Do you think [see below] have/has too much or too little power and influence on Washington?
Influential Parties Too much Too little
About right 
(volunteered) Don't Know
Big Companies 84% 6% 4% 5%
Political Action Committees, which give 
money to candidates 83% 7% 2% 9%
News Media 77% 8% 8% 7%
Political Lobbyists 74% 12% 4% 10%
TVŹand Radio Talk Shows 54% 24% 10% 12%
Labor Unions 39% 40% 7% 15%
Opinion Polls 35% 44% 8% 13%
Racial Minorities 32% 50% 8% 10%
Churches and Religious Groups 27% 52% 9% 12%
Public Opinion 15% 74% 6% 5%
Small Business 5% 85% 3% 6% _____
Source: Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll, conducted 5/10-11/2000. 900 Registered Voters surveyed; 
Compiled by the CitizenÕs Research Foundation for the Study of Campaign Finance Reform at the 
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0 131 30.32% 146 33.80% 212 48.96% 213 49.08%
1 to 20 88 20.37% 66 15.28% 10 2.31% 17 3.92%
21 to 40 19 4.40% 16 3.70% 14 3.23% 31 7.14%
41 to 60 29 6.71% 23 5.32% 21 4.85% 1 0.23%
61 to 80 24 5.56% 28 6.48% 17 3.93% 28 6.45%
81 to 99 26 6.02% 23 5.32% 21 4.85% 1 0.23%
100 115 26.62% 130 30.09% 138 31.87% 143 32.95%
_____
108th Congress
              Source: NARAL Congressional Records on Choice, 1997-2006
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Table 7: NARAL PAC Contributions, 1998-2006







$1 to $1,000 114 6.55%
$1,001 to $2,000 71 4.08%
$2,001 to $3,000 33 1.90%
$3,001 to $4,000 12 0.69%
$4,001 to $5,000 20 1.15%
$5,001 to $6,000 5 0.29%
$6,001 to $7,000 5 0.29%
$7,001 to $8,000 7 0.40%
$8,001 to $9,000 3 0.17%
$9,001 to $10,000 13 0.75%
____________
            Source: www.opensecrets.org                                                                      
             Mean: $396.87                                                                                             


















Column A Column B Column C
Variable
Political Affiliation
-0.009 62.120 *** -0.204
(0.023) (1.627) (0.159)
-0.339 ** 35.244 ** -0.454 **
(0.124) (12.388) (0.160)
Religious Affiliation
-0.122 *** -27.265 *** -0.036
(0.033) (3.275) (0.077)
-0.102 ** -33.524 *** 0.003
(0.035) (3.398) (0.092)
-0.144 *** -30.718 *** -0.050
(0.043) (4.210) (0.088)
Additional Variables
-0.002 * 0.097 -0.002 **
(0.001) (0.084) (0.001)






n 1511 1511 1511
_________________
                  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, standard errors in parentheses
Constant
     Proportion Daughters
Table 8: Regression Coefficients for the "Na•ve" OLS Model and the 
2SLS Model
     Catholic
     Christian
     Age
     NARAL Score
     Democrat
     Independent







62.120*** -0.204 64.623 *** 0.025 59.398*** -0.546 + 57.697 *** -0.150 64.997 *** -0.256
(1.627) (0.159) (2.250) (0.179) (2.478) (0.313) (2.404) (0.247) (2.049) (0.231)
35.244** -0.454 ** 30.736 ** -0.579 * -7.385 0.029 61.533 *** -0.750
(12.388) (0.160) (13.431) (0.242) (18.651) (0.167) (15.508) (0.282)
Religious Affiliation
-27.265 *** -0.036 -19.796 *** 0.001 -73.038 *** -0.132 -22.929 *** -0.244 ** -29.851 *** 0.219 -21.583 ** -0.239 * -20.181 *** 0.004
(3.275) (0.077) (4.211) (0.116) (9.134) (0.118) (4.977) (0.079) (4.594) (0.170) (6.889) (0.112) (3.766) (0.084)
-33.524*** 0.003 -32.537 *** 0.104 -72.559 *** -0.99 -29.849 *** -0.233 ** -36.291 *** 0.309 -20.095 ** -0.207 + -34.044 *** 0.069
(3.398) (0.092) (4.426) (0.180) (9.255) (0.116) (5.087) (0.095) (4.839) (0.202) (7.283) (0.108) (3.814) (0.129)
-30.718 *** -0.050 -30.547 *** -0.058 -72.528 *** -0.103 -26.803 *** -0.259 ** -34..293 *** 0.230 -35.516 *** -0.193 -24.770 *** -0.023
(4.210) (0.088) (7.207) (0.181) (9.400) (0.117) (6.141) (0.093) (6.075) (0.195) (8.516) (0.173) (4.811) (0.101)
Additional Variables
0.097 -0.002** -0.200 -0.004 0.315 *** 0.001 0.224 -0.001 -0.162 -0.002 -0.018 -0.003 * 0.125 -0.002
(0.084) (0.001) (.156) (0.002) (0.083) (0.001) (0.221) (0.002) (0.205) (0.003) (0.134) (0.001) (0.103) (0.001)
0.008** 0.011 * 0.003 + 0.004 0.013 * 0.006 0.009
(0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
9.714*** 9.633 * 8.687 *** 11.614 *** 9.082 * 7.233 * 9.879 ***
(2.342) (3.838) (2.595) (3.157) (3.633) (3.421) (2.986)
28.336 0.104 103.280 -0.363 60.482 0.071 16.264 0.274 43.361 -0.241 22.757 0.353 26.024 0.016
(5.905) (0.105) (9.928) (0.579) (10.587) (0.110) (11.413) (0.127) (14.238) (0.346) (9.607) (0.141) (7.228) (0.139)
n 1511 1511 709 709 796 796 693 693 746 746 525 525 986 986
______________
Total
First Stage Second Stage
     Proportion Daughter
     Catholic
     Christian
     Age
     NARAL Score*
               + p < .1 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, standard errors in parentheses
Second Stage
Table A1: Coefficients from the 2SLS Linear Probability Model of Receiving NARAL PAC Contributions on Legislator Characteristics, by demographic and political 
Constant
     Democrat
     Independent
     Protestant
Democrats
Second Stage First Stage
Republicans Under 55 Over 55 South non-South
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Sta